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Abstract 
 
This dissertation focusses on the forecasting power of breadth of ownership of 
Portuguese mutual funds on stock returns. Firstly, to the best of our knowledge we are 
the first to conduct such a test using Portuguese data, while most other studies tend to 
focus on the markets of China and the United States. We utilize a model with 
differences of opinion and short-sales constraints similar to that of Chen et al. (2002). 
Using data on mutual fund holdings we find that stocks which are in the lowest tercile 
(stocks with the largest negative changes in breadth) in terms of change of breadth 
significantly underperform stocks in the highest tercile (stocks with the largest positive 
changes in breadth), in one month and one quarter horizons but the results are mixed 
when looking at longer horizons. We also find evidence to show that short-sales 
constraints matter for stock returns. Therefore, when short sales constraints are binding 
stocks prices are high when compared to fundamentals. This proves that our results are 
consistent with the Miller (1977) model. Further, we show that are results hold during 
periods of a financial crisis as well. This study also highlights that there are limits to 
arbitrage, as suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), because of market frictions such 
as short-sales constraints which can lead to abnormal returns in constraint stocks.  
  
Key-words: Differences of opinion, short sale constraints, breadth of ownership, 
forecast, returns, mutual funds.  
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1. Introduction: motivation, aim and research question  
 
As of March 2014, there were a total of 174 mutual funds in Portugal managed by 17 
different companies. Total assets under management amounted to approximately 8 
billion euros a yoy increase of approximately 26%. Thus, this increase shows that 
mutual funds continue to grow in importance and provide benefits to investors which 
include portfolio diversification and portfolio management at reduced costs. In addition, 
mutual funds manage large amounts of assets and for this reason it is also important to 
study them.  
Recently there has been significant research conducted which has focussed on the 
combined impact of heterogeneous expectations and short sales constraints on the cross-
section of stock returns. The idea was first posited by Miller (1977) who suggested that 
if short sales are constrained the price of a security will be determined by the valuation 
of the optimists because pessimists will not possess the ability to short and hence are 
left with no other option but to sit on the side-lines and observe. Hence, the restriction 
of short-sales can play a significant role in determining equilibrium prices and returns.  
Even though Miller’s idea has garnered significant attention over the recent years, there 
is still mixed evidence about the role which heterogeneous expectations and short-sale 
constraints play in forecasting future returns. The majority of empirical studies seem to 
focus on the component of short-sales constraints such as D’Avolio (2002) and Boehme 
et al. (2006); however empirical studies focussing on differences of opinions are 
becoming more popular. There is also some possible behavioural explanations that 
attempt to explain what causes investors to differ in opinion such as; gradual 
information flow
1
, limited attention and heterogeneous priors (Hong and Stein 2007). 
Earlier studies focussed on short interest, either in the stock market or in the option 
market for example Figlewski and Webb (1993) and Dechow et al. (2001). Moreover, 
recent studies have been conducted on actual investors in the actual stock market. 
Perhaps the most popular example is that of Chen et al. (2002) who coined the term: 
breadth of ownership, which refers to the number of mutual funds found to have long 
                                               
1
 Gradual information flow refers to the transmission of information that is observed by a 
particular group of investors that is viewed as sensational to them which prompts them to trade 
on such information. This initial set of investors will then trade with latter investors who receive 
the same information through a different medium or source.  
 2 
positions in a stock. The focus of the research was to provide a sharper test of Miller’s 
theory since they deemed that the proxy short interest was insufficient and weak. Chen 
et al. (2002) find that there is a positive relationship between breadth of ownership and 
security returns. Particularly, they propose that in the presence of short-sales 
constraints, low breadth of ownership in a specific security may signify that the 
negative opinions of pessimists are not incorporated into a stock’s price and therefore 
the price is set based on the opinions of optimists. This results in the stock being 
overpriced and is corrected shortly which results in low returns being observed.  
This dissertation analyses the forecasting power of the change in breadth of ownership 
in a model with differences of opinion and short-sales constraints. Breadth of ownership 
refers to the number of mutual funds found to have long positions in a stock which is 
observed monthly based on reporting requirements. Change in breadth of ownership is 
determined as the difference in breadth of ownership of a particular security between 
the present and previous months. The measure of change in breadth of ownership is 
used as a proxy for heterogeneous expectations since changes in mutual fund holdings 
can be seen as mutual funds differing in opinion about the value of a security. Change 
of breadth ownership is used instead of absolute breadth ownership because it can be 
argued that absolute breadth of ownership can be considered as a permanent stock 
characteristic. This brings us to the main hypotheses that we attempt to answer in this 
study:  
 An increase (decrease) in a stock’s breadth at time t should forecast higher 
(lower) returns over some future interval from t to t+k.   
 
 If there are other time-t variables that are known to be positively related to risk-
adjusted returns (perhaps book-to-market, earnings-to-price, or momentum), 
then breath at time t should be positively correlated with these predictive 
variables.  
 
 After controlling for other known predictors of returns, the ability of breadth at 
time t to forecast returns should be reduced though not necessarily eliminated.  
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The main aim of this study is to examine the effect that short-sales constraints and 
heterogeneous expectations have on the cross-section of stock returns in the Portuguese 
stock market by focussing on the monthly equity holdings of Portuguese mutual funds. 
There are a total of 59 mutual funds in our sample from the time period of January 2003 
to December 2012. This time period was selected because we believe that ten years will 
result in a representative sample and it also allows me to investigate the effect if any the 
most recent financial crisis had on the change in breadth measure.  
To the best of our knowledge there has not been a similar study which has focused on 
the Portuguese market; similar studies undertaken have focused on the United States 
and Chinese markets. The use of mutual fund data in Portugal provides me with the 
opportunity to present results from a market that has not been explored since most 
studies focus on the US and Chinese markets.  
Our study will be looking at the monthly equity holdings of mutual funds to see if 
changes in breadth are able to predict returns for the subsequent month. Further, the 
findings of the research may prove pertinent to traders and regulators. Regulators may 
observe that by creating impediments to short selling, they are reducing the efficiency 
by which financial markets operate. In other words, a security’s price may differ greatly 
from its fundamental value if short sellers are not allowed to impart their own 
valuations on a security and in turn cause a downward bias on its price. Additionally, 
traders may view the breadth of ownership as a robust forecasting indicator and may 
utilize it in a trading strategy in order to earn significant returns similar to a momentum 
strategy first posited by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).  
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. In the next section we conduct a 
review of the existing literature on this topic. In section 3 we outline the model 
developed by Chen et al. (2002) that illustrates how differences of opinion and short 
sales constraints affect individual stock prices. Also, in this section we go into further 
detail about the three competing hypotheses which we aim to test. In Section 4 we 
describe the data we use to conduct the tests. Our main empirical results are presented 
in Sections 5 and 6 and in Section 7 we present our conclusions.  
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2. Review of the Literature  
 
Miller (1977) attests that the greater the divergence of opinion on the return of a 
security the higher the price compared to its fundamentals. Observed prices in the 
market often differ from their fundamental price, meaning that there is continuous 
mispricing in the market and it appears that these abnormal returns are not arbitraged 
away. For mispricing to continually persist in a market which contains professional 
investors, limits to arbitrage must exist (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). If the price or rate 
of return on a stock is higher than its fundamentals then it can be expected that 
professional arbitrageurs would attempt to take advantage of such an anomaly in order 
to earn profits. Accordingly, if mispricing is present but not arbitraged away then it can 
be reasonably assumed that there are some limits of arbitrage such as short-sales 
constraints present in the market.  
The reasoning behind Miller’s idea appears plausible and simple to understand. As 
individuals we differ in opinion over a vast range of things no matter the importance, so 
it should not appear farfetched that we as individuals will arrive at different conclusions 
about the fundamental value of a security. Differences of opinion may be the root cause 
for trading volume in financial markets. Harris and Raviv (1993) document that 
increases in trading among speculators is induced because investors differ on the value 
of the asset being traded. The end result is that increases in volume leads to positive 
absolute price changes. Further, various macroeconomists and financial analysts 
regularly differ on the prospects or the outlook of a firm, industry or on an economy as 
a whole even though they have access to the same information. Weather forecasters 
come up with conflicting weather reports despite having access to the same weather 
data from their various national weather databases. Information is interpreted differently 
by individuals and could mean different things to each individual.  
Miller’s argument comprises of two necessary components: heterogeneous expectations 
and short-sales constraints. The literature has tended to focus on various proxies of 
these two components, with studies focusing on breadth of ownership, analysts’ 
heterogeneous expectations, turnover and short interest.  
The remainder of this literature is divided into the following sections in order to sum up 
the views of past studies on the topic of divergence of opinion and short-sales 
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constraints. In the next section we focus on the studies that looked at short-sales 
constraints, followed by those that focussed on short interest. After we then focus on 
behavioural finance explanations and then institutional ownership. Subsequently we 
look at studies on breadth of ownership and turnover. Lastly on those studies that 
looked at homogenous versus heterogeneous expectations.  
2.1 Short-Sales Constraints 
 
Miller’s argument was that when there are short sales constraints, a stock’s price will 
tend to represent the valuation of the optimists and not that of the pessimists simply 
because they are left with no choice but to sit out of the market because they are 
restricted from short-selling.  On the other hand, Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) state 
there is no relationship between divergence of opinion and future stock returns. Further 
to Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) findings, Reed (2002) discovers that stocks which 
are costly to short sell have larger price reactions to earnings announcement, especially 
to bad news. According to Reed (2002) short sales constraints are accompanied with a 
decrease in trading and decreases in the informativeness of trades by 30%. Short sales 
constraints influence the rate at which privileged information is relayed to the public 
and leads to informational inefficiency. If traders are rational, then short sale restrictions 
will not lead to biased upward prices. Prices should not be biased upward in the 
presence of short sales restrictions because if traders are rational they will not overreact 
to news and cause a stock to trade higher than its fundamentals. In this case there should 
be no need for short-selling if traders are rational. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) 
argue that Miller’s model should be seen as a measurement of how fast information is 
incorporated into prices. In other words, good news is incorporated into prices at a 
faster pace than bad news. Bad news is not revealed as fast because pessimists are 
restricted from selling short, restricting them from acting on the information. Therefore, 
the implications of short sales constraints are related to a reduction in the speed in 
which prices are able to adjust to information and it is this slow pace that impacts the 
future returns of a security and not divergence of opinion.  
Further, Shiller (2003) states the true cost of shorting stocks is not represented solely by 
the explicit cost of borrowing the shares because it excludes the psychological costs that 
play a part in restraining short selling.  One of the psychological costs includes the 
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unlimited loss potential associated with shorting stocks. A further restriction to shorting 
is presented by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), who show that investors find it difficult 
to close short positions when they are experiencing losses because of the pain of regret 
associated with losses. In fact, investors tend to get far more upset by losses than they 
are satisfied with gains. With the unlimited potential for losses involved with short 
selling individual investors will tend to avoid such situations that could involve in them 
facing such a difficult psychological dilemma.  
2.2 Short Interest 
 
The earlier relevant empirical research has focussed on the relationship between short 
interest and expected returns. Short interest refers to the total amount of shares that have 
been sold short but not yet covered. It is considered a market sentiment indicator that 
tells whether investors think a stock’s price is likely to fall. It is derived by dividing the 
number of shares sold short by the total number of outstanding shares. Gopalan (2003) 
documents that short interest is positively related to disagreement amongst investors. 
Further, he shows that while using short interest data as well as additional proxies; 
analysts forecast dispersion, institutional holdings and turnover, stocks which are more 
short-sales constrained tend to earn lower returns to a tune of 0.19% to 0.89% monthly. 
Asquith et al. (2005) attest that stocks with high short interest underperform the market 
return measured by four factor time series regression models. In fact, based on equally 
weighted portfolios, stocks with lower institutional ownership coupled with high short 
interest have more negative returns.  
High lending fees are associated with stocks with high divergence of opinion and these 
stocks are also faced with the larger risk of being recalled by their lenders (D’avolio, 
2002). Certainly if short interest is used as a proxy for divergence of opinion then those 
stocks which experience higher divergence of opinion will prove too costly to short and 
the subsequent increase in turnover makes the recall of the loan more likely. 
Consequently, differences in short interest amongst similar stocks may be as a 
consequence of the many risks or the high costs involved for actually shorting these 
stocks. D’avolio (2002) elaborates that short sellers face many costs which may include 
the risk of recall and even though most stocks can be borrowed and shorted, the 
differences in the costs to short may indeed be reflected in differences of short interest. 
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This creates an interesting dilemma because a stock which has low or zero short interest 
may indeed just be one which is too difficult or costly to short, this can simply be 
interpreted as instead of less, more negative information is held off the market.  
2.3 Institutional Ownership  
 
Nagel (2005) posits that short-sales constraints are most likely to constrain stocks which 
have low institutional ownership because professional investors are prohibited from 
selling short so they cannot trade against the overpricing of a particular stock. 
Institutional investors are likely to be more sophisticated when compared to individual 
investors, therefore if a stock becomes under-priced sophisticated outside investors can 
exert buying pressure. In the other scenario when a stock becomes over-priced 
sophisticated outside investors are not able to exert downward pressure because they are 
restricted from selling short but existing sophisticated investors will sell the stock in this 
scenario. Further, Nagel (2005) found that the loan stock supply needed in order to go 
short is higher when institutional ownership is high. Thus, stocks with low institutional 
ownership are most likely to be more constrained because of short sales restrictions and 
limited stock loan supply. Additionally, it can be said that because institutions or 
professional traders are considered to have better stock picking skill than individuals it 
can be expected that stocks with lower institutional ownership will underperform. 
Almazan et al. (2004) document that approximately 70% of mutual funds in the United 
States during the period 1994-2000 that filed Form N-SAR reported that they were 
formally restricted from short-selling due to their investment policies. In fact, in the 
study only 9.8% of the mutual funds that were allowed to short-sell actually did. As 
well, Koski and Pontiff (1999) establish that 79% of equity mutual funds do not make 
use of derivatives, signalling that funds are not using alternative methods to sell short. 
Further proof comes from Asquith et al. (2005) who state that short sales constraints 
tend to bind when there is strong demand but a limited supply of a shares. In other 
words, short selling is more restrictive in the event that a security’s price is trading 
higher relative to its fundamentals and when institutional ownership is low.  
2.4 Breadth of Ownership 
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Chen et al. (2002) looked at the term breadth of ownership as a proxy for divergence of 
opinion. If there is a reduction in the number of owners of a particular security, Chen et 
al. (2002) deem this to be a reduction in ownership breadth which is associated with 
low future returns. Their argument is similar to that of Miller’s because they impose 
short-sale constraints on their model which restrict mutual funds from selling short. The 
reduction in the number of mutual funds with long positions in a stock can be seen as a 
negative signal similar to that of short interest, so in that regard breadth of ownership 
can be seen as a proxy for short interest. Particularly, Chen et al. (2002), propose that in 
the presence of short-sales constraints, low breadth of ownership in a specific security 
may signify that the negative opinions of pessimists are not incorporated into a stock’s 
price and therefore the price is set based on the opinions of optimists. This results in the 
stock being overpriced and is corrected shortly after which results in low returns being 
observed. In the event a fund receives negative information or bad news pertaining to a 
security, they will reduce their holdings to zero because of the restriction imposed. They 
focus on the quarterly equity holdings of mutual funds for the period of 1979 to 1988 
and find that there is a positive relationship between breadth of ownership and security 
returns. In fact in the study, stocks whose change in breadth in the previous quarter is in 
the lowest decile (highest negative changes in breadth) underperform stocks in the 
highest decile (highest positive changes in breadth) by 6.38% a year. Thus, as the 
number of mutual funds which are long in a stock decrease, this is seen as a reduction of 
ownership breadth and hence predicts subsequent low future returns. Turning to the 
markets of Shanghai and Norway, Choi et al. (2013) and Priestley and Ødegaard (2005) 
find results similar to that of J. Chen et al. (2002) that changes in breadth of ownership 
of mutual funds is positively related to future returns. However, because their data 
allows them to focus on the complete ownership structure of stocks they find that while 
focussing on solely the retail sector the effect is different, retail breadth of ownership is 
negatively related to security returns in Shanghai and Norway respectively.  
On the other hand, Nagel (2005) and Bodnaruk and Ostberg (2009) document results to 
the contrary of Chen et al.’s (2002) study. For instance, Nagel (2005) finds that 
expanding the Chen et al. (2002) sample by five years to 2003; stocks with reduction in 
breadth outperform stocks with increases in breadth by a significant margin. Nagel 
posits that the contrary results he documents could be probably related to the technology 
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bubble. Bodnaruk and Ostberg (2009) using data on the Stockholm Stock Exchange and 
focussing on the period of 1996 to 2001 document a negative relationship between 
change in mutual fund breadth and stock returns.  
Focussing on a wider shareholder base, Peress (2005) using data on British American 
Depositary Receipts suggests that an increase in breadth of ownership results in 
improved risk sharing while larger informativeness reduces risk resulting in a decrease 
in mean and variance of returns. Assuming that shares are widely distributed, 
companies that are widely held or otherwise have many shareholders are more 
susceptible to divergence of opinion and hence their prices are more likely to reflect the 
valuation of the optimists. The increase in the shareholder base limits the risk shared by 
each shareholder and the amount of information in the price of a security increases the 
probability that the valuation is correct hence limiting the volatility of returns. In other 
words, an increase in breadth of ownership results in a decrease in returns because as 
the shareholder base increases investors have less incentive to search for private 
information because each individual shareholder bears less risk.  
2.5 Turnover  
 
Turnover has also been used as a proxy for divergence of opinion. Lee and 
Swaminathan (2000) and Boehme et al. (2006) using turnover as a proxy suggest that 
high dispersion firms, those firms with the largest amount of turnover have a tendency 
of earning lower future returns while low dispersion firms earn higher returns. In 
essence it appears that low volume firms tend to be undervalued by the market while 
high volume firms are overvalued. Focussing on the Internet bubble Ofek and 
Richardson (2003) find that over the period from 1997 to 2002 the extraordinary 
increases in the prices of Internet stocks were accompanied by an extreme explosion in 
trading volume. They also find further evidence that there were substantial short-sales 
restrictions for Internet stocks during the period meaning that investors who were 
pessimistic about prices were unable to impart their beliefs on the stock by short selling 
and leading to a reduction in the price towards its fundamental value. In particular, in 
early 2000, the Internet sector represented roughly 20 percent of the equity traded 
volume on the market at this time.  Gervais et al. (2001) document similar results and 
state that stocks which experience abnormal high (low) trading volume relative to their 
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normal volume levels, over a day or a week tend to increase (decrease) over the course 
of the following month. It appears that trading volume can be deemed an indicator of 
investor sentiment, when prices appear to be high in relation to their fundamental values 
this is accompanied by abnormal trading volume (Hong and Stein, 2007). However, the 
use of turnover as a proxy is somewhat controversial since Jones et al. (1994) posit that 
it is the number of transactions and not necessarily the size of transactions that contains 
information content. Consequently, volume of turnover may not be a suitable proxy for 
measuring divergence of opinion.   
Further testing of the Miller (1977) hypothesis has been also undertaken on the IPO 
market. In the IPO market short selling is constrained even though the restriction is 
steadily removed over time, so the initial IPO market price is free to converge to its 
fundamental value which leads to underperformance in the long run. Short sales 
constraints lead to the price being set by the optimists because they will show their 
approval by purchasing the shares while the pessimists have no choice but to stay out of 
the market.  Loughran and Marietta‐Westberg (2005) use a large sample of new issues 
of IPOs and SEOs and focussed on the subsequent stock performance following an 
extreme price movement within the first three years after the offering. After a positive 
or negative +/- 15% one day return event, strong underperformance subsequently 
follows and recorded returns are significantly short of the predictions of the four factor 
model. Using turnover as a measure of divergence of opinion, the authors’ document 
that extreme event days are associated with wide divergence of opinion and there is a 
negative linkage between higher levels of divergence of opinion and future stock 
performance. Gao et al. (2006) using early market return volatility, a proxy for 
divergence of opinion is negatively related to subsequent IPO long term excess returns 
and is highly significant for up to three years after the initial offer. Moreover, the 
relationship is stronger in IPO markets where the short sales constraints is stronger, than 
in non-IPO markets, thus adding support to Miller’s hypothesis. It appears that the 
initial prices in an IPO offer are inflated by the purchases of optimists but as a result of 
the divergence of opinion they are subject to subsequent long run underperformance.  
2.6 Dispersion in Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts  
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Diether et al. (2002) utilize the dispersion in analyst earnings per share forecast as a 
proxy for differences of opinion. They document that stocks with higher dispersion in 
analysts’ earnings forecasts typically earn lower future returns than otherwise similar 
stocks. In fact, a portfolio of stocks in the highest quintile of dispersion underperforms a 
portfolio of stock in the lowest quintile of dispersion by an annual rate of 9.48%.  This 
occurrence is most prevalent in small stocks and stocks that have performed poorly over 
the past year. The study coincides with Miller (1977) because the authors show that any 
friction which hampers the divulgence of negative information can be viewed as an 
alternative mechanism to the short-sales constraints emphasized in the Miller model. 
Analysts tend to avoid giving opinion on stocks which they deem to possess a poor 
outlook simply based on the incentive structure in place; it is highly unlikely that there 
is any incentive involved for analysts who give a negative opinion on a particular stock. 
Thus a stock which should receive a negative outlook or sell recommendation will not 
receive such because of analyst reluctance to state opinions on such stocks.  
Doukas et al. (2006) examining the relationship between analysts’ heterogeneous 
expectations and stock returns document results which are contradictory to those of 
Diether et al. (2002). Using a diversity measure provided by Barron et al. (1998) to 
capture divergence of opinion and four levels of short selling constraints Doukas et al. 
(2006) show that divergence of opinion is priced at a discount meaning stock returns are 
positively associated with divergence of opinion. They further state that the results in 
Diether et al. (2002) study could be documenting negative association between 
uncertainty in analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock returns. Evidence of this negative 
association has been found in the studies of Pástor and Pietro (2003) and Jiang et al. 
(2004). Their conclusions provide no support for Miller’s 1977 overvaluation 
hypothesis.  
2.7 Homogenous versus Heterogeneous Expectations 
 
As mentioned earlier, the study may provide evidence that there are limits to arbitrage 
in the market and also provide evidence to the contrary that markets are efficient. The 
proponents of rational finance argue that the future returns of a stock should be directly 
related to its riskiness; the risk/reward ratio but past research has shown that other 
variables with no relation to risk are able to forecast returns, both in the time series and 
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in the cross section. Also, based on the efficient market hypothesis investors should 
have homogenous expectations and markets should be frictionless, meaning there 
should be no constraints to short selling. On the other hand, we have seen that many 
studies focus on the impact divergence of opinion and short sales constraints have on 
financial markets.  
But what induces disagreement of opinion amongst investors, especially since rational 
finance would like us to believe that all investors have homogenous expectations. 
Perhaps, Hong and Stein (2007) surmises it best by stating that the three mechanisms 
that creates disagreement among investors are; gradual information flow, limited 
attention and heterogeneous priors.  In terms of limited attention investors are only 
capable of paying attention to a subset of relevant information and the impact of this 
limited attention on stock prices and volume is dependent on how the information is 
displayed to the public, in other words how sensational the information is. DellaVigna 
and Pollet (2005) provide evidence that shows when a firm publishes earnings on a 
Friday, the subsequent volume and price movements is less when compared to 
announcement made on other days of the week. They give a possible explanation and 
state that the reason for this is because over the weekend the information is somewhat 
forgotten because investors become distracted and forget about the news on Monday 
morning when they have the opportunity to act upon it.  
The concept of heterogeneous priors has been detailed extensively above. Hong and 
Stein (2007) add another spin to it by postulating that a number of investors that observe 
the same earnings announcement may trade together because they all revise their 
valuation of the stock. Lastly, in terms of gradual information flow, certain investors 
will receive value relevant information before others because of technology of 
distribution or investor specialization. If the piece of information is positive investors 
who receive it first may revise their valuation upwards while those investors who have 
not been privy to the news as yet remain with their previous valuation. The end result is 
that the first set of investors will initiate trade with the latter set of investors.  Huberman 
and Regev (2001) provide the perfect example to help to explain the gradual 
information flow concept. They examine the stock behaviour of a biotechnology 
company; EntreMed which possessed the licensing rights of potential new cancer-
curing drugs. The company was featured in the New York Times in an attention 
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grabbing feature about a breakthrough in cancer research, which subsequently led to an 
increase in the stock price from $12 to $52 in one day.2 However, the same information 
was printed six months before in the scientific journal Nature and in the New York 
Times albeit in a less high-profile article. While the company experienced an increase in 
stock price from the initial article, it paled in comparison to the latter increase after it 
was published on the front page. The conclusion is that a small group of investors who 
focus on the particular industry and that read the scientific journal received the 
information initially while a larger group got the information afterwards upon reading 
the feature. The end result was that the market took several months to fully incorporate 
the news into the stock’s price and the first group of buyers benefit because they do not 
revise their valuation upwards and are able to trade with the larger group of buyers.  
Decades after Miller (1997) initially floated the idea that short-sales constraints and 
divergence of opinion affect the future price of a security. There appears to be general 
agreement that short-sales constraints and divergence of opinion do indeed affect the 
price of a security. Various authors use various proxies such as turnover, breadth of 
ownership and dispersion in analysts’ expectations for divergence of opinion. On the 
other hand, there is no clear consensus as to whether divergence of opinion is positively 
or negatively related and if it even has any relation with future stock returns. In 
addition, we provide various explanations as to what may cause disagreement amongst 
investors.  
  
                                               
2
 Odean (1998) and Barber and Odean (2008)  establish that investors tend to purchase stocks 
that grab their attention.  
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3. The model  
 
We use the model developed by Chen et al. (CHS) (2002). The model considers the 
pricing of a single stock and has two dates. There is an aggregate supply of Q shares of 
the stock which pays a terminal dividend of F + ε per share at time 2 where ε is a 
normally distributed shock which has a mean of zero and a variance of one. At time 1 
two different types of traders exist. There is a group of buyers who face short-sales 
restrictions and can only take long positions; these buyers can be considered to be 
mutual funds. There is a constant supply of such buyers with valuations, evenly 
distributed on the interval [F-H, F+H]. It is expected that on average the buyers have the 
correct valuation, but there is heterogeneity amongst the group, with the degree of the 
heterogeneity parameterized by H. 
The total size of the buyer population is conformed to one and each buyer possesses 
constant absolute-risk-aversion (CARA) utility, with a risk tolerance of γB. Therefore, 
with the non-existence of short-sales constraints, a buyer i with valuation of Vi would 
have demand γ(Vi-P). On the other hand because of the constraint, observed demand is 
restricted to Max [0, γB(Vi-P)].  
The second group of traders belong to a group of fully rational arbitrageurs which are 
capable of taking both long and short positions. This group of buyers can be thought of 
as hedge funds, which face no short-sales restrictions and have the skills and resources 
to minimize any frictional costs accompanied with such transactions. The arbitrageurs 
also possess CARA utility and their accumulated risk tolerance is γA, so that their total 
demand is represented as γA(F-P).  
In the event short-sales constraints did exist for the buyers, market wide demand at time 
1, represented by Q
DU
 would be given by: 
    
 
  
 ∫  B (   P) d   +   (F P).                 (1) 
   
   
 
 
Performing the integration given in equation (1), and setting the demand Q
DU 
equal to 
the supply Q, it can be easily illustrated that the price at time-1 in this unconstrained 
case, depicted by P
U
, satisfies: 
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When there are no short-sales constraints, heterogeneity of the buyers have no effect on 
price. In other words the valuations of the optimists and pessimists offset each other and 
the price observed is the same if all buyers had the rational expectations given as F.  
Moreover, when there are short-sales constraints, market wide demand, now represented 
by Q
DC
 is given by  
    
 
  
 ∫  B (   P) d   +   (F P).                 (3) 
   
 
 
 
After performing the integration and setting the market clearing condition that Q
DC
 = Q 
we obtain a quadratic formula which gives the two roots given below:  
       
  
  
(    √  
         
 
 
)     
 
Note that it is not possible for the larger of the two roots to be an equilibrium price 
because it exceeds the highest possible valuation of the short-sales constrained 
investors, F + H. Taking the smaller of the two roots gives the constrained price P
c
 
below 
        
  
  
(    √  
         
 
 
)     
 
Moreover, the short sales constraint only holds if the price in the unconstrained case P
U 
is greater than the valuation of the most pessimistic buyer, F – H. In other words the 
short-sales constraints only holds if H is significantly large; for instance if H ≥ 
 
     
. P
C
 
= P
U
 at H = 
 
     
 , at this point the buyers which have the lowest valuation of F – H are 
at their reservation point. If H < 
 
     
 the market is at the equilibrium price of P
U 
and 
even those buyers with the lowest valuation of F – H will be long the stock. Thus, when 
the degree of divergence of opinion (H) is less than the supply of the stock adjusted for 
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risk, the short-sales constraint does not bind and the unconstrained price P
U 
is the 
equilibrium price.  
The equilibrium price, denoted by P* is given by:  
     
{
 
         
 
      
 
         
 
     
 
              
Where       
            
 
 
 
 
Following CHS the above equilibrium P* possesses a few intuitive properties. Firstly P* 
is always higher than the unconstrained price - P
U
. Further, P* is positively correlated 
with the heterogeneity parameter H, which indicates that the expected return on the 
stock between time 1 and 2, F-P* decreases with H. This relationship exists for any 
finite value of γA; as the risk tolerance of the arbitrageurs goes to infinity, both P* and 
P
U
 approach F, so that expected returns with or without short-sales constraints will tend 
towards zero.  
(F-P*), the difference between fundamentals and price is being used as a synonym for 
expected returns. One limitation of the model is that it does not include any factor risks 
that are usually seen in classical pricing models such as the CAPM or APT, so (F-P) in 
the model is more accurately thought of as the net factor-risk adjusted expected return. 
Hence in a more classical setting with no priced factor risks, arbitrageurs risk tolerance 
will be infinite and as a result (F-P*) would be zero, because P* increases with 
heterogeneity while heterogeneity increases with arbitrageurs risk tolerance γB. 
The effect of arbitrageurs risk tolerance on the stock price can cause it to move in either 
direction. For instance, if H is significantly large compared to Q, in particular 
when     
  
  
, then the stock price is greater than the fundamental value F, so 
arbitrageurs will take short positions. If γA increases in this event, the stock price 
decreases converging towards F. When H is small compared to Q, the stock is below the 
fundamental value so arbitrageurs will take long positions. In this situation an increase 
in γA signifies an increase in risk sharing capacity thus driving the stock upward.  
3.1 Breadth and expected returns  
 
 17 
The main objective of this study is to investigate the interaction between expected 
returns and the breadth of ownership amongst Portuguese mutual funds, which are 
subject to short-sales constraints. In the study the measure of breadth developed by CHS 
is used. The measure is defined as:  
     [
      
  
   ]        
Where B = breadth of ownership 
 F = fundamental value  
 H = degree of heterogeneity 
B is used to denote the breadth of ownership. This measure requires that breadth is 
constrained between zero and one. It is one when the price of a stock is less than or 
equal to the valuation of the most pessimistic buyers and it converges to zero when a 
stock’s price approaches the valuation of the most optimistic buyers.  
Before we begin to delve into the study we first highlight the propositions discussed by 
CHS about what kind of relationship between breadth and expected returns is 
influenced by variation in the parameter H. The propositions are given below.  
 
Proposition 1: As the divergence of opinion H increases, breadth B and the expected 
return (F-P*) both decrease.  
 
If we only take into account a cross-section of stocks that only vary in difference of 
opinion, then only those stocks with lower values of opinion should also have lower 
expected returns. The above is exactly what Miller (1977) in mind.  
However, if the only source of variation in stocks were the divergence of opinion across 
stocks, then the variable of short interest could be used. For instance, those stocks with 
the highest divergence of opinion will also be the most heavily shorted by the 
arbitrageurs because price will be higher that the fundamentals. Therefore, high values 
of short interest could also be used to forecast lower returns.  
On the other hand, the relationship between short interest and expected returns is much 
less robust than that between expected returns and breadth. This can be demonstrated by 
focusing on variations in some of the other parameters of the model. Particularly, in 
equation (7) where H ≥ 
 
     
 , breadth of ownership decreases with H since λ decreases 
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with H as well. Therefore, breadth is decreasing with increases in H which establishes 
the proposition.  
 
Proposition 2 – Cross-stock variation in any of the model parameters (γA, γB or Q) 
induces a positive correlation between breadth and expected returns. Thus, regardless 
of the source of variation, the unconditional correlation between breadth and expected 
returns is unambiguously positive.  
 
Understanding, proposition 2 is fairly simple and can be seen by simply focussing on 
equation (7). Holding H constant, breadth is determined entirely by (F-P*), the 
difference between fundamentals and price or expected returns. Therefore anything that 
drives P* upward relative to the fundamentals of the stock, in other words a change in 
γA, γB or Q, will also result in a decrease in breadth. Changes in Q should not just be 
thought of as a supply shock but as unmodeled changes in investor sentiment, similar to 
that in Delong et al. (1990), which influences divergences between prices and 
fundamentals. Consequently, breadth is a robust indicator.  
 
Proposition 3 – Suppose    
  
  
. In this case, P* ≥ F so that arbitrageurs take short 
positions. Moreover, an increase in γA leads to an increase in short interest. This 
increase in short interest is accompanied by a decrease in prices and hence by an 
increase in both breadth and expected returns.  
 
When H is large enough, changes in γA create a positive correlation between short 
interest and expected returns. The opposite happens for the correlation created by 
variations in H, for instance an increase in H results in an increase in price and hence a 
decrease in both breadth and expected returns. Thus the model illustrates an uncertain 
link between breath and expected returns. The same cannot be said of short interest. 
This adds credence to the earlier point that there is no good theoretical reason to assume 
that short interest is a reliable predictor of returns.  
3.2 Testable hypotheses 
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Propositions 1 and 2 enable the testing of three hypotheses for the purpose of the 
empirical study.   
 
 Hypothesis 1 – An increase (decrease) in a stock’s breadth at time t should 
forecast higher (lower) returns over some future interval from t to t + k.  
 
 Hypothesis 2 – If there are other time-t variables that are known to be positively 
related to risk-adjusted future returns (perhaps book-to-market, earnings-to-price 
or momentum) then breadth at time t should be positively correlated with these 
predictive variables.  
 
 Hypothesis 3 – After controlling for other known predictors of returns, the 
ability of breadth at time t to forecast future returns, should be reduced though 
not necessarily eliminated.  
 
Hypothesis 1 is clearly a by-product of propositions 1 and 2. Hypothesis 2 follows that 
if breadth is positively correlated with the risk-adjusted expected return (F-P*) on a 
stock, any other observable variables that can be considered good proxies for risk-
adjusted expected returns, breadth should be positively correlated with these proxies as 
well.  
To use an example given by CHS, assume that there is a non-risk-related momentum 
effect in stock prices (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), so that returns from time t to t+k 
are positively correlated with returns from t-k to t. In this example, one would expect 
breadth at time t to be positively related to past returns. Therefore, if a stock’s price was 
to fall from t-1 to t, breadth should follow suit and fall as well.  The idea is that with 
momentum a drop in a stock’s price from t-k to t is an indication that the price at t is 
high relative to the stock’s fundamentals. Note that with momentum a decline in price is 
most likely to be followed by further declines than a change in the trend. Since the 
median buyer makes a precise assessment of the fundamentals, the buyer will be more 
inclined to sell the stock at time t. In other words, since decreases in breadth is assumed 
to indicate that the short-sales constraints is more binding, so the constraints binds more 
after the price decline.  
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Meanwhile, if a particular variable is capable of forecasting returns simply because it is 
a good proxy for risk, one should not expect it to be positively related to movements in 
breadth. For instance, if Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1996) were correct in stating 
that book-to-market is solely a risk measure then one should not expect for breadth to be 
lower in low book-to-market glamour stocks.  
Hypothesis 3 follows Hypotheses 1 and 2. For instance if breadth at time t is correlated 
with earnings-per-share then one should expect breadth to have less forecasting power 
once we control for past earning-per-share ratios. Since it is hypothesized that breadth is 
a valuation indicator it is hoped that the predictive power of the breadth variable is not 
significantly subsumed by a known predictor such as the earnings-per-share ratio.  
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4. Data  
As of March 2014, there were a total of 174 mutual funds in Portugal managed by 17 
different companies. Total assets under management amounted to approximately 8 
trillion euros.  Our data on Portuguese mutual fund holdings in the study comes from 
the Information Disclosure System on the Commissão do Mercado de Valores 
Mobiliários (CMVM) website. This database contains information on monthly equity 
holdings of mutual funds based in Portugal. Mutual funds are required by CMVM 
regulation #5/2010 to disclose their monthly portfolio holdings. Following Article 7 – 
Equity UCITS of CMVM Regulation No. 15/2003 we restrict our sample to mutual 
funds whose portfolio composition is made up of at least 66.67% shares and those 
whose names contain “acções” (shares).  
The ideal sample for our study would have been that of a universal investor sample but 
due to lack of data and information it is not possible. However, we believe that mutual 
funds are good representatives of the investing universe since mutual funds have 
increased in importance over the last few decades and as mentioned above mutual funds 
tend not to sell short.  
We study mutual funds monthly equity holdings because mutual funds can be 
considered a proxy for short sales constraints since certain regulatory requirements in 
most cases constrain the ability of mutual funds to sell short. Using short interest as a 
proxy for divergence of opinion in our study will prove to be problematic and is not 
robust enough of a measure for what we are trying to determine. This approach is on 
fragile ground and is not a suitable proxy to capture the amount of negative information 
that is withheld from a security’s market price.   
Similar to CHS we define BREADTHt as the number of mutual funds that hold a long 
position in a stock to the total number of mutual funds in the sample for that month. We 
have a total of 59 mutual funds and 120 monthly observations for the change of breadth 
during the period studied. To avoid measuring changes in the composition of the 
number of mutual funds in the sample we take care only to measure the trading 
activities of existing funds. In the sample new funds are created while existing funds are 
dissolved. For instance, at the beginning of the sample period, 2003M1 we have data on 
39 funds and at the end of the sample, 2012M12 we have data on 34 funds.  Most 
importantly to define ∆BREADTHt, we restrict the sample of funds to those funds that 
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have a long position in the stock at the end of both month t and month t – 1. From this 
sample, we take the number of funds who hold the stock at month t minus the number 
of funds who hold the stock at month t-1and divide by the number of funds who hold 
the stock at month t-1. The restriction ensures that ∆BREADTHt measures the trading 
activity of only existing funds, rather than changes in the investor universe due to new 
funds entering or dissolving. Therefore the sample does not suffer from any 
survivorship bias.  
Change in breadth can be decomposed into the variables INt and OUTt. INt is measured 
as the percent of funds in the sample at both months t and t-1, that had a zero position in 
the stock at month t-1 and that open a new position at month t. OUTt is the percent of 
funds in the sample at both months t-1 and t that moved from a positive position to a 
zero position in the stock at month t. By construction ∆BREADTHt equates to INt minus 
OUTt.  
To ensure that the results are not affected by changes in the mutual fund sector’s 
aggregate holdings of a stock we compute a measure denoted HOLDt. HOLDt is 
calculated as the total number of shares held by all mutual funds at the end of month t 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding at the end of that month. ∆HOLDt is 
difference in HOLDt between months t and t-1.  
The returns and trading volume data is collected from The Thomson Reuter Datastream. 
We only analyse stocks of firms that are incorporated in Portugal, which are also 
represented by the code 114 on the CMVM website. We do not exclude stocks that are 
no longer trading so as to avoid a survivorship bias in our sample. However, we exclude 
stocks which undergo a name change due to becoming a new company, for example 
through a merger. Some of these companies include PT Multimedia and ZON 
Multimedia and Parerede and GLINT Technological Services.  
LOGSIZEt is calculated as the logarithm of market capitalization collected from The 
Thomson Reuter Datastream at the end of month t. We obtain data on book value and 
earnings from The Thomson Reuter Datastream, where book value is defined as the 
value of common stockholders’ equity and is divided by the firm’s market capitalization 
on the day of the firm’s fiscal year-end to yield the book-to-market ratio, denoted as 
BK/MKTt. For each month we also collect from The Thomson Reuter Datastream each 
firm’s primary earnings per share. This value is then cumulated for the past twelve 
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months, in order to derive the firm’s past twelve months cumulative primary earnings 
per share. This value is then divided by the price of the stock at the end of the same 
month to arrive at earnings-per-share, represented as E/Pt. MOM12t is calculated as each 
stock’s 12 month cumulative holding period return at the end of the month. We also 
obtain monthly data on share turnover and the number of shares in circulation from The 
Thomson Reuter Datastream for each month. We then calculate share turnover for each 
month as the total number of shares traded divided by the total number of outstanding 
shares, resulting in the measure TURNOVERt. 
4.1 Summary Statistics  
 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. A few things 
can be observed from the results.  
Firstly in Panel A, the mean value of BREADTHt is closely related to market 
capitalization ranging from 16.29% for stocks in the lowest tercile to 36.08% for stocks 
in the largest tercile which indicates that stocks are held on average by between 16 and 
36 percent of the mutual funds in the sample. Another thing that stands out from our 
analysis is that the standard deviations of ∆BREADTHt are also closely related to firm 
size. In addition, the mean value ∆BREADTHt for the stocks in the sample is -0.05% 
which means on average mutual funds rarely sell their positions.  
Further, only a few mutual funds hold long positions in the lowest-cap stocks at any 
given point in time. LOGSIZEt and TURNOVERt are mostly highly correlated to 
market capitalization as well, which indicates that funds prefer to hold larger, more 
liquid stocks.  
MOM12t is negatively correlated with market capitalization. For stocks in the lowest 
tercile MOM12t is 0.37% and is -0.021% for stocks in the largest tercile. This indicates 
that the larger, more liquid stocks reported negative earnings based on a 12 month 
holding period during the time studied in the sample. E/Pt is negative in terciles 1 and 2 
registering figures of -0.24 and -0.19 respectively but 0.759 in tercile 3. The stocks in 
tercile 3 which reported positive earnings were the stocks held by majority of mutual 
funds.  
Further, Panels B and C illustrate that similar to CHS the raw value of BREADTHt 
cannot be used as an empirical analog to our model’s B variable. While, BREADTHt 
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only has a monthly correlation of 0.5, it is still highly correlated with LOGSIZEt and 
TURNOVERt with contemporaneous correlations of 0.786 and 0.134 respectively. This 
just further concretes our earlier statement that the majority of funds hold large, liquid 
stocks. Additionally, there is a correlation of -0.168 between BREADTHt and BK/MKTt 
which also indicates that funds tend to prefer to hold more glamour stocks over value 
stocks. Similar results were documented by Shefrin and Statman (1998) and Chen et al. 
(2002). Similar to CHS, with the intention to remove these fixed firm effects, we work 
instead with ∆ BREADTHt. 
Table 1 Summary Statistics 
The sample includes stocks from Portugal’s stock market between 2003 and 2012. 
BREADTHt is the fraction of mutual funds long the stock at the end of month t. 
∆BREADTHt is the change in breadth of ownership from the end of month t -1 to month 
t. INt is the fraction of mutual funds in the sample at both months t-1 and t that have 
established a new position in a stock at month t. OUTt is the fraction of mutual funds 
that have completely removed an existing position in a stock at month t. HOLDt is the 
fraction of shares outstanding of a stock held by mutual funds at the end of month t. 
∆HOLDt is the change in the fraction of shares held by mutual funds from the end of 
month t – 1 and month t. LOGSIZEt  is the log of market capitalization measured at the 
end of month t. BK/MKTt is the most recently available observation of book-to-market 
ratio at the end of month t. E/Pt is past year’s earnings per share divided by the price at 
the end of month t. TURNOVERt is the share turnover in month t among stocks listed 
on the Portuguese stock market. MOM12t is the raw return in the twelve months up to 
month t. Size terciles are calculated using percentile calculations monthly based on 
change in breadth of the stocks being studied. Number of observations in each tercile is 
1374, 1660 and 1574 observations for terciles 3, 2 and 1 respectively.  
 
Panel A: Means and 
Standard Deviations 
All Firms 
Tercile 3 
(largest firms) 
Tercile 2 
Tercile 1 
(smallest 
firms) 
BREADTHt 
Mean  36.080% 54.952% 39.212% 16.290% 
Std. dev.  21.239% 12.655% 15.723% 14.397% 
∆BREADTHt 
Mean  -0.054% -0.134% -0.030% -0.009% 
Std. dev. 2.880% 4.179% 2.547% 1.479% 
INt Mean  0.782% 1.442% 0.714% 0.277% 
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Std. dev. 2.094% 2.874% 1.889% 1.107% 
OUTt 
Mean  0.836% 1.576% 0.744% 0.286% 
Std. dev. 2.162% 3.120% 1.759% 1.064% 
HOLDt 
Mean  2.822% 0.926% 3.929% 3.308% 
Std. dev. 3.755% 0.861% 3.949% 4.418% 
∆HOLDt 
Mean  -0.015% -0.010% -0.011% -0.023% 
Std. dev. 0.385% 0.189% -0.011% -0.023% 
LOGSIZEt 
Mean  8.513 9.503 8.524 7.638 
Std. dev. 0.832 0.317 0.352 0.432 
BK/MKTt 
Mean  1.031 0.753 0.921 1.390 
Std. dev. 1.324 0.746 0.731 1.968 
E/Pt 
Mean  0.076 0.759 -0.191 -0.240 
Std. dev. 5.209 1.040 6.370 5.926 
TURNOVERt 
Mean  4.479% 5.954% 4.232% 3.451% 
Std. dev. 11.100% 5.914% 10.590% 14.452% 
MOM12t 
Mean  0.152% -0.021% 0.089% 0.370% 
Std. dev. 10.982% 8.613% 10.782% 12.869 
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5. Results 
5.1 Determinants of ∆BREADTH  
 
The upcoming section is divided into 2 subsections, with the aim of examining the 
determinants of breadth. The first section focuses on the book-to-market specification 
and the second the earnings to price specification. The objective is in relation to 
Hypothesis 2, where we want to see to what degree, if any ∆BREADTH is capturing the 
information in other well-known predictors of stock returns such as the book-to-market 
and earnings to price ratios.   
5.1.1 Book-to-market ratio specification  
 
In Table 2, we present the results of regressing ∆BREADTHt against the following five 
variables: ∆HOLDt, LOGSIZEt, BK/MKTt, MOM12t and TURNOVERt. In 
implementing the regressions we followed the same methodology as Chen et al. (2002) 
and ran a separate regression each month for each of the three size classes. Afterwards, 
the regression coefficients are averaged across months, to retrieve a result for each size 
class. Ultimately, the coefficients for each size class are averaged together to produce an 
overall result for the entire sample. The rationale behind this method is that as can be 
seen in Panel A of Table 1, there is significantly higher variance in ∆BREADTHt among 
larger stocks. Running a single regression for all the stocks pooled together would result 
in the larger stocks having an unbalanced influence on the final results due to 
heteroskedasticity. For instance the figure 1.7894 in tercile 1 for the ∆HOLDt variable 
was calculated by adding all the coefficients from the monthly regressions resulting in a 
total of 120 coefficients and then calculating the average. The result is an average 
coefficient of 1.7894.  
Table 2 Specification including BK/MKTt  
 
The sample includes stocks from Portugal’s stock market between 2003 and 2012. 
∆BREADTHt is the change in breadth of ownership from the end of month t -1 to month 
t. ∆HOLDt is the change in the fraction of shares held by mutual funds from the end of 
month t – 1 and month t. LOGSIZEt  is the log of market capitalization measured at the 
end of month t. BK/MKTt is the most recently available observation of book-to-market 
ratio at the end of month t. TURNOVERt is the share turnover in month t among stocks 
listed on the Portuguese stock market. MOM12t is the raw return in the twelve months 
up to month t. Size terciles are calculated using percentile calculations monthly based 
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on change in breadth of the stocks being studied. Number of observations in each tercile 
is 1374, 1660 and 1574 observations for terciles 3, 2 and 1 respectively. A total of 120 
different regressions were run for each tercile. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
     
 
 
∆HOLDt 
 
LOGSIZEt 
 
BK/MKTt 
 
MOM12 
 
TURNOVERt 
 
Average R
2 
(%) 
Size 
Tercile 1 
1.7894 -0.0006 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0083 58.64*** 
 (-0.3123) (-1.2068) (2.8246)*** (-1.1995) (1.5467)*  
Size 
Tercile 2 
1.7083 -0.0016 0.0035 0.0281 0.0156 52.39*** 
 (4.5611)*** (-.08732) (-.2298) (1.2909)* (0.6432)  
Size 
Tercile 3 
15.5092 0.0074 0.0067 0.0693 -0.0165 58.90*** 
 (3.7970)*** (1.1164) (0.6416) (-1.0456) (-0.9870)  
Full 
Sample 
6.3357 0.0017 0.0035 0.0323 -0.0031 56.64*** 
 (2.6820)*** (-0.3052) (1.0788) (-0.3181) (0.4010)  
Significant at the 1 percent level - *** 
Significant at the 5 percent level - ** 
Significant at the 10 percent level - * 
 
Firstly, in Table 2 we can clearly see that there is a significant positive correlation 
between ∆BREADTHt and ∆HOLDt, even though the results are statistically 
insignificant for the stocks in the smallest tercile. This result is expected since that when 
a larger percentage of a given stock is owned by the mutual fund sector, a fair 
assumption can be made that a greater number of mutual funds will hold long positions 
in the given stock.  
Further, from the table it seems that there is a weak positive correlation between 
∆BREADTH and the momentum variable, MOM12t. However this result is statistically 
insignificant for all of the size classes except tercile 2 and indicates only a small 
economic effect. Since the result garnered is only significant in tercile 2 we cannot 
make the conclusion that the full sample is consistent with the second hypothesis, that 
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momentum is a future predictor of returns. However, momentum can be considered a 
future predictor of returns for mid-capitalization stocks that is stocks in our second 
tercile. A possible explanation could be that short sales constraints are binding in 
Portugal, thereby limiting the ability of arbitrageurs to impose their influence on stock 
prices. Thus arbitrageurs are held in check and are unable to drive prices down 
approaching their fundamental levels.  
In contrast, the BK/MKTt variable has a positive correlation with ∆BREADTHt but is 
only statistically significant stocks in the smallest size class which is consistent with our 
second hypothesis that the book-to-market ratio can be considered a predictor of future 
returns. This result is in contrasts in regard to the smallest size class with Chen et al. 
(2002) and Fama and French (1992, 1993 and 1996) that the book-to-market variable 
solely captures risk and not mispricing when compared to fundamentals. In conclusion, 
if the book-to-market ratio is associated with any risk-adjusted predictability it is not 
relevant enough to create a desire for investors to sell short.  
5.1.2 Earnings-to-price ratio specification  
 
Table 3: Specification including E/Pt  
 
The sample includes stocks from Portugal’s stock market between 2003 and 2012. 
∆BREADTHt is the change in breadth of ownership from the end of month t -1 to month 
t. ∆HOLDt is the change in the fraction of shares held by mutual funds from the end of 
month t – 1 and month t. LOGSIZEt  is the log of market capitalization measured at the 
end of month t. E/Pt is past year’s earnings per share divided by the price at the end of 
month t. TURNOVERt is the share turnover in month t among stocks listed on the 
Portuguese stock market. MOM12t is the raw return in the twelve months up to month t. 
Size terciles are calculated using percentile calculations monthly based on change in 
breadth of the stocks being studied. Number of observations in each tercile is 1374, 
1660 and 1574 observations for terciles 3, 2 and 1 respectively. A total of 120 different 
regressions were run for each tercile. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
∆HOLDt 
 
LOGSIZEt 
 
E/Pt 
 
MOM12 
 
TURNOVERt 
 
Average R2 
(%) 
Size 
Tercile 1 
1.723 -0.001 0.0000 -0.0072 -0.0011 58.86*** 
 (1.1030) (-1.0917) (0.4406) (-1.9289) (1.5250)*  
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Size 
Tercile 2 
1.4985 -0.0024 0.0014 0.0368 -0.0011 52.62*** 
 (4.2473)*** (-1.4126) (-0.7611) (1.9652)** (0.7025)  
Size 
Tercile 3 
12.4328 0.0023 0.0044 0.0344 -0.0054 59.51*** 
 (3.2508)*** (1.0990) (0.1121) (0.4128) (-0.9387)  
Full 
Sample 
5.2181*** -0.0003 0.0019 2.0215 -0.0025 57*** 
T-statistic (2.8670) (-0.4684) (-0.0694) (0.1497) (0.4296)  
Significant at the 1 percent level - *** 
Significant at the 5 percent level - ** 
Significant at the 10 percent level - * 
 
In Table 3, the same procedure was followed as above but replacing the BK/MKTt 
variable with the earnings to price ratio E/Pt. The E/Pt variable was used to replace the 
BK/MKTt variable in our second tests because studies such as Campbell and Shiller 
(2001) have shown that the earnings-to-price ratio can be considered a predictor of 
future returns. The coefficient of E/Pt is positive but is statistically insignificant across 
all size classes. Therefore we cannot make any conclusions about this variable within 
our model because of its statistical insignificance. Whereas Chen et al. (2002) posit that 
the earnings to price ratio contains more information about non-risk related movements 
in expected returns than book to market, the same conclusion cannot be derived from 
this study.  
While Chen et al. (2002) examine the determinants INt and OUTt because a typical 
stock in the Quintiles 2 – 5 in their study is only held on average by 2.3% of mutual 
funds in their sample. This created a problem because it was assumed that in their 
model that all firms were continually monitoring a particular stock. With an average of 
2.3% of the funds holding a particular stock, a mutual fund may be sitting on the side 
line not because it has the correct fundamental valuation of a stock but simply because 
the stock is not on the fund’s radar. Fortunately, our study is not plagued with such a 
problem since stocks are held by an average 36.08% by the mutual funds in the study. 
Additionally, the number of stocks on the Portuguese stock market is significantly lower 
than the number of stocks floating on the American stock exchanges. Therefore, it can 
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be reasonably assumed that the mutual funds in the study have the majority of the stocks 
located in the sample on their radar during the period being studied.  
5.2. Using ∆BREADTH to forecast returns  
5.2.1 Portfolio Sorts 
 
We now focus on Hypothesis 1 and 3, which looks at using the ∆BREADTH variable to 
forecast stock returns. In Table 4 the forecasting is conducted using portfolio sorts 
utilizing the methodology followed by Chen et al. (2002). In Panel A of Table 4 we sort 
stocks into three portfolios every month based solely on ∆BREADTH. The Portfolios 
are rebalanced monthly. To accomplish this we firstly arrange stocks into terciles of 
∆BREADTH, determined separately within each size tercile. To be clearer, stocks are 
arranged into different groups, stocks with the largest negative change in breadth are 
placed in the lower tercile or the P1 portfolio while stocks with the highest positive 
change in breadth are placed in the highest tercile or the P3 portfolio. The stocks are 
then recombined across size classes, with the intention to ensure that within each 
∆BREADTH tercile there will have stocks of roughly the same size. The rationale is 
that as illustrated in an earlier table there is much greater variation in ∆BREADTH 
across larger stocks. Thus, if the stocks were ranked just simply based on size, the 
extremely high and low terciles based on ∆BREADTH would be greatly influenced by 
large stocks. Raw returns (excluding transactions costs) are then calculated for holding 
periods of one month and one, two, three and four quarters after the portfolio formation 
date.  
Table 4 Returns to portfolio strategies for various holding periods 
 
The sample includes stocks from Portugal's stock market between 2003 and 2012. In 
each month t, stocks are ranked into terciles relative to other stocks in their size quintile 
on the basis of their change in breadth, ∆Breadtht. Then for stocks in similar terciles of 
∆BREADTHt across the size terciles, an equal-weighted portfolio is formed and the 
performance is tracked over four quarters. Returns are calculated for holding periods of 
one month, one, two, three and four quarters. This table reports the average returns of 
the portfolios in each tercile of the sort on ∆BREADTHt along with the difference in the 
returns of portfolios in terciles 3 and 1, P3 – P1. Panels A, B, C and D present these 
results using raw returns, size adjusted returns, book-to-market adjusted and momentum 
adjusted returns respectively. Number of observations in each portfolio is 1374, 1660 
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and 1574 observations for portfolios 3, 2 and 1 respectively. All returns are calculated 
excluding transactions costs. T-statistics are presented in parentheses.   
Panel A: Sort on ∆BREADTH 
Cumulative 
Returns After 
1Month 1 Quarter 2 Quarters 3 Quarters 4 Quarters 
Raw Returns 
Portfolio 1 -0.54% -0.76% 3.90% 2.18% -1.02% 
 (0.56) (0.01) (1.11) (0.95) (0.38) 
Portfolio 2 0.21% -0.20% 0.11% -0.53% 2.59% 
 (3.41)*** (1.45)* (6.56)*** (4.66)*** (11.40)*** 
Portfolio 3 0.65% 3.27% 2.49% 11.37% 1.16% 
 (2.65)*** (6.01)*** (4.95)*** (8.19)*** (4.45)*** 
P3 – P1 1.19% 4.03% -1.41% 9.19% 2.18% 
 (0.76) (3.00)*** (5.84)*** (7.79)*** (4.01)*** 
Panel B: Size Adjusted Returns 
Cumulative 
Returns After 
1Month 1 Quarter 2 Quarters 3 Quarters 4 Quarters 
Portfolio 1 -0.69% -1.36% -1.65% -2.24% 6.12% 
 (4.49)*** (2.03)** (0.44) (2.06)** (3.65)*** 
Portfolio 2 0.08% -0.30% 1.59% 1.60% 0.00% 
 (2.30)** (0.83) (11.23)*** (9.50)*** (6.24)*** 
Portfolio 3 0.79% 5.09% 5.66% 16.50% 3.07% 
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 (2.89)*** (7.40)*** (7.11)*** (9.16)*** (5.60)*** 
P3 – P1 1.47% 6.45% 7.31% 18.74% 9.19% 
 (0.75) (3.75)*** (5.25)*** (9.51)*** (1.75)* 
Panel C: Book-to-Market Adjusted Returns 
Cumulative 
Returns After 
1Month 1 Quarter 2 Quarters 3 Quarters 4 Quarters 
Portfolio 1 -0.57% -0.69% 5.41% 5.22% 3.75% 
 (2.73)*** (0.26) (7.75)*** (9.51)*** (6.84) 
Portfolio 2 0.30% 0.20% 0.70% 0.04% 4.20% 
 (4.15)*** (3.85)*** (8.61)*** (6.10)*** (14.02)*** 
Portfolio 3 1.04% 4.94% 9.66% 26.76% 15.51% 
 (3.30)*** (7.31)*** (8.99)*** (10.57)*** (10.30)*** 
P3 – P1 1.61% 5.63% 3.97% 21.53% 11.76% 
 (0.74) (5.35)*** (12.23)*** (14.53)*** (12.97)*** 
Panel D: Momentum Adjusted Returns 
Cumulative 
Returns After 
1Month 1 Quarter 2 Quarters 3 Quarters 4 Quarters 
Portfolio 1 -0.53% 1.17% 11.08% 5.56% 0.26% 
 (2.31)** (3.84)*** (10.67)*** (9.74)*** (4.41)*** 
Portfolio 2 0.50% -0.39% -1.31% -1.01% -8.89% 
T-statistic (5.53)*** (0.18) (0.50) (2.71)*** (31.53)*** 
Portfolio 3 0.05% 0.87% -4.69% 9.08% -0.50% 
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T-statistic (1.19) (2.00)** (6.58)*** (4.62)*** (2.01)** 
P3 – P1 0.58% -0.30% -15.77% 3.52 -0.77% 
 (0.61) (5.02)*** (0.88) (12.07)*** (5.73)*** 
Significant at the 1 percent level - *** 
Significant at the 5 percent level - ** 
Significant at the 10 percent level - * 
 
Panel A of Table 4 shows the cumulative returns for three portfolios sorted on change in 
breadth amongst stocks. We report results similar to Chen et al. (2002) and Bodnaruk 
and Ostberg (2009). Further, the results are similar to those presented by Choi, Jin, and 
Yan (2013) and Priestley and Ødegaard (2005) in Shanghai and Norway markets 
respectively. The portfolio with the lowest ∆BREADTHt has a slightly lower return than 
the one with the highest ∆BREADTHt in all holding periods except that of two quarters 
after the portfolio formation date. The difference is 4.03% on a quarterly basis which is 
certainly an economically significantly difference. This equates to an annualized rate of 
return of 17.12%. Thus, the fact that mutual funds decide to liquidate their position in a 
stock in the previous quarter can be considered a negative signal. These results are 
consistent with Miller’s hypothesis.  
Concentrating on the ability of the change in breadth to predict next month’s returns, we 
acknowledge that the use of this method assumes that information is constantly 
revealed. The information can be revealed based on Miller (1977) intuition in terms of 
pessimistic investors being held in check due to their to the restrictions on short selling 
or based on the intuition of Diamond and Verrechia (1987) in the form of continued 
trading which leads to the revelation of information. Additionally, using monthly 
observations have the advantage of increasing significantly the number of the 
observations and also perhaps improve the accuracy of our estimates. The results above 
show that for those stocks in the lowest tercile that is those stocks with negative changes 
in breadth, cumulative returns after one month is –0.54% and for those stocks in the 
highest tercile returns are 0.65% after one month. This results in a total difference of 
1.19% and an annualized rate of return of 12.56%. The result is somewhat surprising 
because one would expect that as the frequency of trading increases that mutual funds 
will make note of the fact, mutual funds liquidate their positions in the previous periods 
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and act on this information. Hence, the difference in returns for the monthly period 
should be higher than the difference in returns observed during the quarterly period. 
Bodnaruk and Ostberg (2009) provide a possible explanation stating that perhaps there 
is much more noise in the breadth measure during the monthly observations when 
compared to quarterly observations.  
However, the change in breadth measure seems to work in the opposite way in regards 
to a holding period of  2 quarters the period reporting a negative difference between the 
lowest and highest terciles of -1.41% and an annualized rate of return of -2.80%. In 
brief reductions in breadth forecast positive returns for a holding period of two quarters 
after portfolio formation. We posit that perhaps after observing that breadth is 
increasing one quarter after the observation date that a portion of mutual funds take 
advantage of the high price being observed and reduce their positions leading to the 
lower prices in the seconds quarter. Additionally, after creating a reduction in price after 
2 quarters the mutual funds also in turn take advantage of the lower price and purchase 
the stock then leading to an increase in price being observed in the third quarter.  
The results presented for stocks in Portfolio 1 are statistically insignificant along with 
the P3-P1 portfolio, while all other results are statistically significant.  
In Panel B of Table 4, we redo everything in Panel A using returns adjusted to manage 
for size. To utilise this control we assign stocks to terciles based on their market 
capitalization at the end of month t. For each tercile an equal-weighted holding period 
return is calculated for one month, one, two, three and four quarters horizons and used 
as the benchmark portfolio return. The size adjusted return for a stock for any given 
holding period is then the holding period of that stock in excess of the holding period 
return on the portfolio to which it belongs. A similar procedure is followed in Panels C 
and D to adjust for book-to-market and momentum. Stocks are allocated to terciles 
based on their book-to-market and momentum ratios. The respective returns are then 
calculated for each portfolio for holding periods of one month, one, two, three and four 
quarters after the portfolio formation date and used as the benchmark portfolio return. 
The book-to-market and momentum adjusted return for a stock for a given holding 
period is the holding period return of that stock in excess of the holding period return on 
the portfolio to which the stock belongs. I was unable to follow a similar procedure to 
that of Chen et al. and form separate groups based on size, book-to-market and 
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momentum because of the relatively low amount of stocks at our disposal. However, I 
believe that I have developed a suitable and relevant alternative. 
The adjustment for size seen in Panel B makes a slight difference in forecasting returns 
over a one month period but a much larger difference when focusing on later periods. 
For instance the difference in monthly returns between the P3 and P1 portfolios are 
1.47% and 6.45% based on quarterly returns. The adjustment results in a difference of 
0.28% and 2.41% based on monthly and quarterly returns respectively when compared 
to returns calculated by sorting on ∆BREADTH. The results indicate that ∆BREADTH 
is slightly positively correlated with size which is also observed in Table 2.  
Implementing the book-to-market control produces results similar to the above control 
for size, returns for one month and one quarter horizons whereas returns for the longer 
horizons vary. After a month and a quarter the P3 – P1 return differences are 1.61% and 
5.63% respectively.  This is not surprising since as observed in Table 2 the book to 
market ratio is slightly positively correlated with the change in breadth measure. The 
results presented are not in line with the third hypothesis since we assumed that by 
controlling for such factors the forecasting power of changes in breadth should be 
reduced whereas in this case it is enhanced. The addition of the two controls leads to 
much higher returns especially for the larger horizons of two, three and four quarter 
horizons.  
In Panel D the adjustment for momentum has a large significant impact on our returns. 
Returns for all holding periods have declined drastically. The P3-P1 differences are 
0.58%, -0.30%, -15.77, 3.52% and -0.77% for holding periods of one month, one, two, 
three and four quarters respectively. Portfolios with lowest momentum in the lowest 
tercile earn larger returns when compared to the highest tercile with stocks of much 
larger momentum ratios. Thus, momentum is positively correlated with the change in 
breadth measure as Table 2 illustrates. The return for the holding period of one month is 
reduced to 0.58%, an annualized rate of return of 7.50%. The predictability of the 
change in breadth measure is then reduced by approximately 50% compared to the case 
of raw returns.  
5.3 The Impact of the Financial Crisis  
In this section we take a look at the impact the most recent global financial crisis has on 
our findings. The idea is to investigate whether during a crisis if the change in breadth 
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measure is still aptly able to forecast future returns and to what degree. Differences of 
opinion about a security’s price should have been common place during the most recent 
financial crisis because stakeholders would have lost confidence in the financial 
industry. The loss of confidence would have led to distrust between financial agents and 
investors and as was observed during the crisis, the prices of securities plummeted. 
With increased volatility and decrease in demand, pessimists would continue to sit on 
the side line and not sell short because it was difficult to predict the price of security in 
the future. Additionally, during most crises restrictions are usually implement that 
restrict or forbid short selling as a means to not depress prices further.   
For the purpose of this analysis we use the returns used in the previous section that were 
used for forecasting purposes but we divided it in two sections; Before the Crisis 
(January 2003 – August 2008) and During the Crisis (September 2008 – December 
2012). We present the results below.  
Table 5 Returns to portfolio strategies for various holding periods (During the 
Crisis and After the Crisis) 
The sample includes stocks from Portugal's stock market between 2003 and 2012 
divided into two periods; Before the Crisis (January 2003 – August 2008) and During 
the Crisis (September 2008 – December 2012). In each month t, stocks are ranked into 
terciles relative to other stocks in their size quintile on the basis of their change in 
breadth, ∆Breadtht. Then for stocks in similar terciles of ∆BREADTHt across the size 
terciles, an equal-weighted portfolio is formed and the performance is tracked over four 
quarters. Returns are calculated for holding periods of one month, one, two, three and 
four quarters. This table reports the average returns of the portfolios in each tercile of 
the sort on ∆BREADTHt along with the difference in the returns of portfolios in terciles 
3 and 1, P3 – P1. Panels A, B, C and D present these results using raw returns, size 
adjusted returns, book-to-market adjusted returns respectively. All returns are calculated 
excluding transactions costs. T-statistics are presented in parentheses.   
Before Crisis (January 2003 – August 2008) 
Panel A: Sort on ∆BREADTHt 
Cumulative 
Raw Returns 
After 
1 Month 1 Quarter 2 Quarters 3 Quarters 4 Quarters 
Portfolio 1 0.56% 2.07% 9.66% 16.25% 5.03% 
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 (0.92) (0.92) (1.46)* (1.56)* (0.65) 
Portfolio 2 0.60% 1.39% 3.32% 2.33% 6.42% 
 (5.86)*** (7.31)*** (12.66)*** (8.74)*** (13.88)*** 
Portfolio 3 2.58% 6.33% 8.05% 24.35% 1.19% 
 (5.11)*** (7.61)*** (6.91)*** (8.58)*** (3.47)*** 
P3 – P1 2.02% 4.26% -1.61% 8.10 -3.84% 
 (4.07)*** (5.70)*** (7.28)*** (8.63)*** (4.65)*** 
Panel B: Size Adjusted Returns 
Cumulative 
Raw Returns 
After 
1 Month 1 Quarter 2 Quarters 3 Quarters 4 Quarters 
Portfolio 1 -0.07% 0.75% 1.69% 7.54% -3.18% 
 (0.33) (2.44)*** (3.50)*** (6.92)*** (1.04) 
Portfolio 2 0.46% 1.25% 5.19% 4.85% 3.54% 
 (4.83)*** (6.88)*** (15.69)*** (11.99)*** (10.09)*** 
Portfolio 3 2.78% 8.12% 11.66% 29.63% 2.97% 
 (5.31)*** (8.58)*** (8.24)*** (9.12)*** (4.42)*** 
P3 – P1 2.85% 7.37% 9.97% 22.09% 6.15% 
 (4.27)*** (7.48)*** (8.08)*** (11.05)*** (3.65)*** 
Panel C: Book-to-Market Adjusted Returns 
Cumulative 
Raw Returns 
1 Month 1 Quarter 2 Quarters 3 Quarters 4 Quarters 
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After 
Portfolio 1 0.44% 2.23% 11.46% 21.37% 10.97% 
 (1.94)** (4.00)*** (8.34)*** (11.10)*** (7.66)*** 
Portfolio 2 0.51% 1.94% 4.10% 3.04% 8.09% 
 (6.54)*** (8.99)*** (14.01)*** (9.72)*** (15.72)*** 
Portfolio 3 3.14% 0.20% 0.39% 1.87% 9.39% 
 (5.65)*** (8.51)*** (9.36)*** (9.89)*** (8.21)*** 
P3 – P1 2.70% -2.03% -11.07% -19.50% -1.58% 
 (5.56)*** (8.59)*** (12.20)*** (13.79)*** (11.18)*** 
Panel D: Momentum Adjusted Returns 
Cumulative 
Raw Returns 
After 
1 Month 1 Quarter 2 Quarters 3 Quarters 4 Quarters 
Portfolio 1 0.59% 5.42% 17.51% 21.90% 6.74% 
 (2.32)** (6.31)*** (9.90)*** (11.20)*** (6.23)*** 
Portfolio 2 0.91% 1.11% 1.33% 1.43% -10.97% 
 (7.80)*** (6.41)*** (8.52)*** (7.41)*** (-21.86)*** 
Portfolio 3 1.56% 3.53% -5.08% 21.79% -0.46% 
 (3.86)*** (5.55)*** (-4.58)*** (8.29)*** (2.50)** 
P3 – P1 0.97% -1.89% -22.59% -0.11% 0.97% 
 (4.43)*** (8.40)*** (4.76)*** (12.61)*** (6.51)*** 
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During the Crisis (September 2008– December 2012) 
Panel E: Sort on ∆BREADTHt 
Cumulative 
Raw Returns 
After 
1 Month 1 Quarter 2 Quarters 3 Quarters 4 Quarters 
Portfolio 1 -1.43% -3.28% -3.02% -8.84% -7.76% 
 (-1.33)* (-1.20) (-0.48) (-0.31) (0.29) 
Portfolio 2 -0.22% -1.89% -4.10% -4.31% -2.27% 
 (-0.16) (-7.43)*** (-9.23)*** (-4.93)*** (0.95) 
Portfolio 3 -0.67% -0.39% -2.73% -2.51% 1.06% 
 (-0.77) (0.52) (-1.35)* (0.56) (2.50)** 
P3 – P1 0.76% 2.89% 0.29% 6.33% 8.82% 
 (-2.09)** (-2.29)** (-2.21)** (-0.79) (0.35) 
Panel F: Size Adjusted Returns 
Cumulative 
Raw Returns 
After 
1 Month 1 Quarter 2 Quarters 3 Quarters 4 Quarters 
Portfolio 1 -1.55% -3.74% -6.43% -11.15% -13.02% 
 -(6.07)*** (-6.90)*** (-9.13)*** (-6.12)*** (-7.25)*** 
Portfolio 2 -0.31% -1.96% -3.04% -2.60% -4.38% 
 (-0.76) (-7.83)*** (-6.14)*** (-1.73)** (-1.93)** 
Portfolio 3 -0.62% 0.33% -1.14% -0.62% 2.78% 
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 (-0.63) (1.43)* (0.27) (1.50)* (3.09)*** 
P3 – P1 0.93% 4.07% 5.29% 10.53% 18.19% 
 (-4.48)*** (-3.59)*** (-5.17)*** (-2.37)** (-1.64)* 
Panel G: Book-to-Market Adjusted Returns 
Cumulative 
Raw Returns 
After 
1 Month 1 Quarter 2 Quarter s 3 Quarters 4 Quarters 
Portfolio 1 -1.42% -3.23% -2.34% -7.61% -4.28% 
 (-5.14)*** (-5.46)*** (-2.52)*** (-1.20) (-0.51) 
Portfolio 2 -0.16% -1.59% -3.65% -3.82% -1.09% 
 (0.24) (-5.85)*** (-7.92)*** (-4.00)*** (2.48)** 
Portfolio 3 -0.54% 0.27% 0.54% 2.61% 11.74% 
 (-0.40) (1.36)* (1.77)** (2.91)*** (5.59)*** 
P3 – P1 0.88% 3.50% 2.84% 10.22% 16.02% 
 (-3.06)*** (-2.71)*** (0.64) (1.86)** (4.15)*** 
Panel H: Momentum Adjusted Returns 
Cumulative 
Raw Returns 
After 
1 Month 1 Quarter 2 Quarters 3 Quarters 4 Quarters 
Portfolio 1 -1.42% -2.20% -0.26% -7.48% -6.73% 
 (-4.91)*** (-2.97)*** (0.69) (-1.04) (-2.33)** 
Portfolio 2 -0.03% -2.04% -5.29% -4.94% -16.91% 
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 (0.98) (-8.25)*** (-12.78)*** (-6.16)*** (-20.20)*** 
Portfolio 3 -0.93% -1.58% -9.43% -3.45% -0.57% 
 (-1.58)* (-1.25) (-10.00)*** (0.06) (1.89)** 
P3 – P1 0.49% 0.62% -9.17% 4.03% 6.16% 
 (-4.43)*** (-2.95)*** (-10.19)*** (-0.55) (0.42) 
Significant at the 1 percent level - *** 
Significant at the 5 percent level - ** 
Significant at the 10 percent level - * 
 
As expected the results in Table 5 show that returns after portfolio formation were 
higher in the period before the crisis than for those calculated during the crisis for all 
holding periods excluding the holding period of one year after portfolio formation. 
Needless to say this result could be because of the length of the holding period, during 
the crisis when prices would have been much more volatile in the short run than in the 
long run. For the aforementioned reason, mutual funds stood a better chance of earning 
a profit on their portfolios with a holding period of one year than those with shorter time 
periods because of extreme volatility in prices being observed during the crisis. Further 
mutual fund managers were probably more cautious during the crisis and only made 
trades that with high probability of earning positive returns to ensure job security during 
this turbulent period.  
Focusing on Panel A of Table 5 the ∆BREADTHt measure the results are similar to the 
results obtained from analysing the ∆BREADTHt measure for the entire time period. 
Holding stocks in the portfolio with the highest increase in ∆BREADTHt and being 
short in the portfolio with negative changes in breadth (P3 – P1) successfully forecast 
positive future returns for holding periods of one month, one quarter and three quarters 
for both periods; before the crisis and during the crisis. On the other hand, during the 
crisis mutual funds were successfully able to forecast future returns for a holding period 
of a year as well. 
Additionally, similar to results presented by forecasting ∆BREADTHt for the entire 
breadth sample, the returns calculated for a holding period of one quarter are higher than 
that of one month after. Thus, the result obtained from analysing the full sample holds 
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in both periods. Therefore, the mutual funds do not take advantage of the higher 
frequency of observations available by monthly trades and rebalance their portfolios 
based on this information.  Mutual funds ability to forecast future returns with holding 
periods of 2 quarters and 1 year improved during the crisis with difference in returns 
between P3 and P1 of -1.62% and -3.84% before the crisis and 0.29% and 8.82% during 
the crisis for holding periods of 2 quarters and 1 year respectively.  The difference 
between the two periods is 1.91% and 12.66% for 2 quarters and one year and 
annualized differences of 3.86% and 12.66% respectively.  
Paying attention to returns adjusted for size, book-to-market and momentum before and 
during the crisis paints a similar picture when looking at results based on the entire 
sample as a collective. For example before the crisis, P3-P1 returns sorted on change in 
breadth and the controls for size and book-to-market for the holding period of one 
month are similar with returns of 2.02%, 2.85 and 2.70% and varies significantly for 
longer periods. Further, P3-P1 returns adjusted for momentum for the holding period of 
one month are lower registering a return of 0.49%.  Similar results can also be observed 
for the period during the crisis.  
6. Conclusion  
 
The objective of this thesis was to determine whether change in breadth of ownership of 
Portuguese mutual funds – a proxy for sales constraints can predict future stock returns. 
Using data for Portugal we have drawn some conclusions similar to those of Chen et al. 
(2002) who focussed on the US market and Choi et al.(2013) and Priestley and 
Ødegaard (2005) who focussed on the markets of Shanghai and Norway respectively. 
We confirm some of their results that an increase (decrease) in breadth results in an 
increase (decrease) in price of a stock for the subsequent quarter. Secondly, the results 
are consistent with the idea posited by Miller (1977) that short-sales constraints are 
important and should be taken into consideration in relation to equilibrium stock prices 
and expected returns. Our results further show that stocks which have a decline in 
breadth of ownership over a month horizon also significantly underperform stocks for 
which the change of breadth has increased.  On the other hand, when controlling for 
other known predictors of returns such as size and book-to-market the forecasting 
power of our change in breadth measure is not reduced and however is enhanced. 
 44 
Further, when controlling for momentum the forecasting power of breadth is reduced 
over holding periods of one month, one, two, three and four quarters. We also separate 
our sample in two sections to determine if the forecasting power of ∆BREADTH is 
affected during a financial crisis and we arrive at the conclusion that the measure is still 
capable of predicting future returns during this period. In conclusion, the change in 
breadth measure is a good predictor of future returns on its own when focussing on the 
Portuguese stock market.  
Our study contributes to the vast amount of literature and provides readers with an 
alternative to the US and Chinese markets. However, our research was not without 
limitations. Due to the small size of the Portuguese market when compared to others we 
were forced to work with only a few observations. I suggest that further research should 
be done focussing on a larger sample, more funds and an extension of the time period. 
Additionally, lack of data on stock ownership of non-institutions did not allow me to 
examine the complete ownership of a particular stock. Therefore, I was not able to see 
the affect retail breadth will have on our results similar to the study of Priestley and 
Ødegaard (2005) who had data on a stock’s complete ownership structure at their 
disposal.   
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